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Abstract
Demand response (DR) is envisaged to be of
significance for enhancing the flexibility of power
systems. The distributed nature of demand-side
resources necessitates the need of an aggregator to
represent the flexible demand in the electricity market.
This paper presents a bilevel optimization model
considering the optimal operation of a strategic
aggregator in a day-ahead electricity market.
Additionally, consumers’ requirements in terms of
comfort satisfaction and cost reduction are considered
by integrating detailed demand models and retail
contract constraints. The results on the considered test
system reveal that centralized optimization models
would tend to over-estimate the capabilities of DR in an
electricity market with strategic participants. Also, the
flexibility value of DR for the power system and the
profitability of the aggregator are significantly
dependent on the retail contracts between the
aggregator and the consumers, highlighting the need for
careful contract design.

1. Nomenclature
Indices
𝑗
𝑘
𝑛
𝑔

Time index
Retail price discretization index
Archetype index
Conventional generator index

Constants:
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑇𝑛,𝑟
, 𝑇𝑛,𝑟
𝑗
𝑂𝑛
∆𝑗
∆𝜋
𝜂𝑛
𝜂𝑆
𝛼𝑛
𝜋 𝑚𝑖𝑛 . 𝜋 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝛽
𝑗
𝜓𝐷
𝑗
𝜓𝑔

Minimum and maximum indoor temp.
Occupancy profile
Time step
Retail price discretization step
Energy retention parameter of RTES
Charging efficiency of pumped storage
No. of buildings for each archetype
Minimum and maximum retail price
Consumer cost reduction parameter
Fixed demand bids
Conventional generation marginal cost
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Optimization time horizon
Number of generating units
Number of building archetypes
Number of discretization steps

Variables:
𝑗
𝑃𝐿𝐴
Total power consumption of load aggregator
𝑗
𝜋
Retail price
𝜆𝑗
Electricity SMP
𝑗
𝑇𝑛,𝑟
Indoor room temperature
𝑗
𝑄𝑛,ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡
Total heat input to building
𝑗

𝑄𝑛
𝑗
𝑄𝑛,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑗

𝑃𝑛
𝑗
𝐸𝑛
𝑗
𝑃𝑔
𝑗

𝑃𝑆,𝑑
𝑗
𝑃𝑆,𝑐
𝑗
𝐸𝑆

Active heat output of RTES
RTES storage heat losses
Power consumption of RTES
Storage level of RTES
Output of conventional generators
Discharged power by pumped storage
Charging power of pumped storage
Storage level of pumped storage

2. Introduction
Effective Demand Response (DR) can yield several
benefits including lower electricity generation costs,
reduced investments in generation, transmission and
distribution assets, and alleviation of the challenges
attributed to large-scale grid integration of variable
renewables [1].
A number of system-wide impact studies regarding
demand flexibility have been reported in literature. For
example, authors in [2], [3] show that temporal shifting
of a price responsive load can potentially improve the
economic operation of the power system. Recent studies
have incorporated more detailed demand models in
conventional centralized power system models (Unit
Commitment/Economic Dispatch (UC/ED)) to assess
the value of DR. The energy arbitrage potential of
residential thermal loads has been evaluated in [4], [5],
while flexibility of electric vehicles (EVs) has been
discussed in [6], [7]. These integrated models highlight
the importance of using detailed demand models in
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terms of capturing the impacts of load shifting on the
consumers and also on the supply mix and electricity
prices. However, these centralized models assume a
perfectly competitive market and, thus, do not take into
account the strategic behavior and objectives of the
various market players.
The distributed nature of the large number of
individual demand-side resources poses challenges for
representing the flexibility and strategic objectives of
these resource-owners (consumers) in the electricity
market. Therefore, distributed demand-side resources
are typically managed by load aggregators (LA), which
act as intermediary agents between the consumers and
the electric utility (e.g. the Transmission System
Operator (TSO)). Although some demand-side
resources (e.g. large industrial consumers) do not need
LAs by virtue of the significant magnitude of their
demand, however, here we focus on the general case of
small-scale distributed demand-side resources which
need to be coordinated for meaningful representation in
the electricity market. The introduction of LAs,
however, has given rise to several questions regarding
the operation of LAs and their impacts on consumer
welfare and system performance.
Several studies have presented models focusing on
the optimal operation LAs, subject to constraints on the
flexible demand. An end-to-end business model for a
profit maximizing aggregator is presented in [8]. The
aggregator manages its portfolio of the population of
DR participants and variable wind generation resource,
and determines bids to place in the day ahead wholesale
market. An optimization model for simultaneous
allocation of frequency services and energy arbitrage for
a fleet of Thermostatically Controlled Loads (TCLs)
managed by an aggregator is presented in [8]. Similarly,
LA-focused models for optimal control of Plug-in
Electric Vehicles are presented in [9], [10]. Recently,
papers considering the game-theoretic (Stackelberg)
interaction between LAs (leaders) and the consumers
(followers) for domestic thermal loads and PEVs [11] [13] have been reported in the literature. These papers
represent the LA as a profit-maximizing entity, which
determines optimal retail prices for consumers, while
consumers aim to minimize their costs subject to those
retail prices. Although the aforementioned studies
provide valuable operating frameworks for LAs, they
tend to isolate the impact of the aggregator’s actions
from the operation of the power system. This is because
these studies consider electricity price as an exogenous
parameter to the LA’s optimization problem and
therefore, cannot account for the feedback impact of the
change in demand on electricity prices.
Papers considering strategic LA bidding in the
electricity markets taking into consideration the impact
of LA’s actions on the power system are rare with the

exception of [14], [15]. These papers present bilevel
models for considering the operation of a strategic LA
controlling a fleet of PEVs. In these models, the LA
aims to minimize its costs in the upper level, while at the
lower level, the total welfare of all market participants
is maximized. The results presented in these papers
highlight the importance of modelling the LA as a
strategic market player and of considering the impact of
LA’s actions on the power system. However, as the
objective of the LA in these models is to minimize its
costs instead of maximizing profits, the proposed
models do not capture the impacts of aggregator’s
actions and the retail contracts on the financial welfare
of PEV owners.
This paper explores the impacts of considering the
consumers’ financial welfare in addition to their comfort
constraints on the operation of a profit maximizing LA
(also assumed to be the retailer for the consumers). The
LA manages the space heating demand of consumers
with residential thermal electric storage (RTES)
devices. RTES devices contain a highly insulated solid
thermal energy storage core which enables the
conversion of electrical energy into thermal energy
stored in an efficient manner for use at a later time [5].
When equipped with communications and control
architecture, these devices can enhance power system
flexibility by virtue of decoupling the scheduling of
electric power demand from the time of thermal energy
end-use. Such smart RTES technology is not only viable
but also commercially available and deployed in several
countries including Ireland, UK, France and the Nordic
countries etc. [17].
Additionally, we demonstrate the drawbacks of
using exogenous price based models in terms of
isolating the impacts of the actions of the LA from
system operation. In summary, this paper extends the
state-of-the art through the following contributions:
1. A bilevel optimization model is implemented
for optimal operation of a LA in an electricity
market which is cleared based on social
welfare maximization.
2. Detailed thermal demand state-space models
are utilized to capture buildings’ thermal
dynamics and end-user comfort constraints
associated to the RTES devices controlled by
the LA.
3. Formulation of optimal retail prices by the LA
subject to consumers’ financial welfare
constraints is integrated in the bilevel model to
capture the impacts of various retail contracts
on LA’s profitability, consumer welfare and
system performance.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3 presents
the mathematical formulation and linearization of the
bilevel optimization problem. Section 4 discusses the
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results of an illustrative example and Section 5
concludes the paper.

3. Model formulation
In this section, we present the optimization model of
a LA, which participates in the day-ahead electricity
market (conducted by the system operator (SO)) on
behalf of consumers with RTES space heating devices.
In a competitive market, a strategic LA would aim to
maximize its total welfare, which depends on the
electricity System Marginal Price (SMP), accepted
demand bids, the retail price set by the LA and the
heating requirements of the consumers. However, the
SMP is not only dependent on the actions of the LA, but
also of the other participants in the market clearing
process conducted by the SO. Therefore, the LA’s
optimization problem is constrained by the outcome of
the market clearing process. This problem exhibits a
bilevel structure, where the LA maximizes its welfare in
the upper-level problem and the market clearing process
is represented in the lower-level problem.

3.1. Consideration of consumers’ welfare
As mentioned above, the LA manages the
consumers’ RTES space heating devices. It is assumed
that the consumers have direct load control (DLC)
contracts with the LA, which allow the LA to control the
RTES devices of residential consumers. Such contracts
exist for both residential and commercial customers in
several European and North American countries [18] [19]. It is also assumed that the total welfare of the
consumers comprises of the satisfaction of their thermal
comfort and the increase in their financial welfare (i.e.
reduced heating costs).
Consumers’ thermal comfort is dependent on the
indoor temperatures, which must be within the comfort
range specified by the consumers. Therefore, the
thermal comfort constraints of the consumers are
incorporated by modelling the evolution of indoor
temperatures using detailed thermal dynamics models of
a number of building archetypes. It is assumed that the
aggregate thermal behavior of all the dwellings
managed by the LA can be represented using a few
building archetype models [20]. The building thermal
dynamics are modelled using lumped parameter
building models (RC thermal networks). Initially, the
detailed building performance models for the
considered archetypes are developed in the EnergyPlus
simulation platform to generate the synthetic thermal
dynamics data [20]. The synthetic data is then utilized
to calibrate the lumped parameter models using the
calibration methodology presented in [21]. After
expanding the heat balance equations for all the nodes,

re-ordering terms, and discretizing the resulting
continuous-time model, the building energy model can
be represented by the state-space equation [5]:
𝑗+1
𝑗
𝑗
𝑥𝑛 = 𝐴𝑛 𝑥𝑛 + 𝐵𝑛,𝑢 𝑄𝑛,ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡 +
(1)
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
𝐵𝑛,𝑑 [𝑇𝑎𝑚𝑏 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑊𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ 𝑇ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙 ]
𝑗

where, 𝑥𝑛 is state vector representing the temperatures
at different nodes of the archetype, and 𝐴𝑛 , 𝐵𝑛,𝑢 and 𝐵𝑛,𝑑
are the state, input and disturbance matrices,
respectively for archetype n at time interval j. The total
heat provided by heating devices for the corresponding
nodes of the archetype is incorporated in terms of
𝑗
𝑄𝑛,ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡 which is defined as follows:
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
(2)
𝑄𝑛,ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡 = 𝑄𝑛 + 𝑄𝑛,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑗

𝑗

where, 𝑄𝑛 is active heat power output and 𝑄𝑛,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 are the
thermal storage losses of the RTES devices. Further
details about the residential thermal modelling can be
found in [5] and [21].
The nature of DLC contracts between the consumers
and the LA entails that the consumers report their initial
RTES charge levels and occupancy profiles to the LA at
the start of the day. However, access to direct control of
the devices and consumer information can result in the
LA acting as an exploitative monopolistic retailer,
resulting in loss of financial welfare (higher costs) for
the consumers. Indeed, analysis of the Norwegian retail
market has shown evidence of electricity retailers
exhibiting monopolistic behavior by exploiting the
passivity of some of their customers [22]. The
consumers, on the other hand, would expect reduction
in their costs as a compensation for giving up their
privacy and control on the flexible RTES devices.
Therefore, the retail contract design should take into
consideration cost reduction for the consumers and
prevent their exposure to exploitative retail prices by the
LA. These consumer welfare related constraints are
formulated and integrated in the LA’s optimization
model described in Section 3.2.

3.2. Load aggregator’s problem
As discussed earlier, the LA is a strategic market
participant, aiming to maximize its welfare. We assume
that the LA maximizes its profits in order to achieve
welfare maximization. The LA’s optimization problem
is formulated as follows:
𝐽
𝑗

max ∑ 𝑃𝐿𝐴 (𝜋 𝑗 − 𝜆𝑗 )

(3)

𝑗=1
𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

arg max: 𝑃𝐿𝐴 , 𝜋 𝑗 , 𝑇𝑛,𝑟 , 𝑃𝑛 , 𝑄𝑛 , 𝑄𝑛,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 , 𝐸𝑛
subject to the following constraints:
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑇𝑛,𝑟
. 𝑂𝑛 ≤ 𝑇𝑛,𝑟 . 𝑂𝑛 ≤ 𝑇𝑛,𝑟
. 𝑂𝑛 ,

(4)
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∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽], ∀𝑛 ∈ [1, 𝑁]
𝑗+1

𝐸𝑛

𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

= 𝐸𝑛 + 𝑃𝑛 . ∆𝑗 − 𝑄𝑛 − 𝑄𝑛,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 ,

(5)

∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽], ∀𝑛 ∈ [1, 𝑁]∀𝑗, ∀𝑛
𝑗

𝑗

𝑄𝑛,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 = (1 − 𝜂𝑛 ). 𝐸𝑛 , ∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽], ∀𝑛
∈ [1, 𝑁]
𝑗

0 ≤ 𝑄𝑛 ≤ 𝑄𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑥 , ∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽], ∀𝑛 ∈ [1, 𝑁]

(6)
(7)

𝑗

∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽], ∀𝑛 ∈ [1, 𝑁]

(8)

𝑗

∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽], ∀𝑛 ∈ [1, 𝑁]

(9)

∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽], ∀𝑛 ∈ [1, 𝑁]

(10)

0 ≤ 𝑃𝑛 ≤ 𝑃𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑥 ,
0 ≤ 𝐸𝑛 ≤ 𝐸𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑥 ,
𝑗

𝑗

𝑃𝐿𝐴 = ∑ 𝛼𝑛 . 𝑃𝑛 ,
𝑛

𝜋 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝜋 𝑗 ≤ 𝜋 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ,
𝐽

∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽]

1
1
∑ 𝜋 𝑗 ≤ ∑ 𝜆𝑗
𝐽
𝐽
𝑗=1

𝐽
𝑗
∑ 𝑃𝐿𝐴 . 𝜋 𝑗
𝑗=1

(11)

𝐽

(12)

𝑗=1
𝐽

100 − 𝛽
𝑗
𝑗
≤(
) ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥 . 𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥
100

(13)

𝑗=1

The objective function (3) of the LA’s optimization
problem maximizes the day-ahead sum of its profits,
which is defined as the difference between LA’s
𝑗
revenue from selling energy to its consumers (𝑃𝐿𝐴 . 𝜋 𝑗 )
and its energy procurement costs from the day-ahead
𝑗
electricity market (𝑃𝐿𝐴 . 𝜆𝑗 ).
Consumers’ thermal comfort and RTES technical
constraints are modelled in Eqs. (4) – (9). Eq. (4)
𝑗
constrains the room temperature (𝑇𝑛,𝑟 ) to be within the
thermal comfort limits during active occupancy periods.
𝑗
𝑇𝑛,𝑟 is determined using the state space model described
in Section 3.1. Eq. (5) models the evolution of the
storage level of the RTES devices, while storage losses
of RTES are calculated using (6). Eqs. (7) - (9) constrain
the active heat output, electric power input and storage
level of the RTES devices to be within their respective
rated values. Finally, the total electricity consumption of
𝑗
the LA (𝑃𝐿𝐴 ) is described in (10) as the scaled up
summation of the electricity consumption by each
archetype, where the scaling factor (𝛼𝑛 ) is the total
number of dwellings belonging to archetype n. Note that
as mentioned above, the heating requirements
determined by the representative archetype models are
assumed to be representative of the total heating
requirements of the LA-controlled dwellings.
Consumers’ financial welfare constraints are
incorporated by specification of the parameters of the
retail contract between the consumers and the LA in (11)
– (13). The constraints expressed in (11) restrict the

retail prices (𝜋 𝑗 ) to be within an agreed range to prevent
the consumers from being exposed to exploitative retail
prices. Additionally, (12) ensures that the average retail
price throughout the day should be less than the average
SMP of electricity for that day. Finally, constraint (13)
specifies that the total daily electricity cost incurred by
𝑗
the consumers (∑𝑗 𝑃𝐿𝐴 . 𝜋 𝑗 ) should be at least an agreed
percentage (β) less than the costs the consumers paid
when the RTES devices were operated as a fixed
𝑗
𝑗
inflexible demand (∑𝑗 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥 . 𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥 ), i.e. the
consumer costs before the introduction of the LA. In
order to determine the electricity consumption by the
RTES devices before the introduction of the LA
𝑗
(𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥 ), it is assumed that the consumers previously
operated their RTES devices as night-time storage
loads. This assumption is justified by the fact that over
the past few decades, residential thermal storage loads
have conventionally been charged during the night-time
in order to exploit the low off-peak tariffs [23]. Under
this night-time charging scheme, all the RTES devices
charge at their rated power (𝑃𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) from 00:00 to 07:00
until they are fully charged or until the night period
𝑗
ends. The fixed night time tariff (𝜋𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥 ) is determined
in this paper by averaging the annual electricity SMPs
(corresponding to hours 00:00 to 07:00)) obtained using
the market clearing model presented in Section 3.3.,
𝑗
𝑗
keeping 𝑃𝐿𝐴 = 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥 .

3.3. Market clearing process
The market clearing process, conducted by the SO,
is a social welfare maximization model. It is assumed
that based on historical market participation data and
forecasting techniques, the LA can estimate the bids of
other market participants [15]-[16]. Additionally, the
technical details of the generating units can be accessed
based on the reports published by the system operators.
The market clearing process is formulated as the
following optimization problem, with the corresponding
Lagrange multipliers mentioned next to each constraint:
𝐽

𝐺

𝑗
𝑗
min ∑ (−𝜓𝐷 . 𝑃𝐷
𝑗=1

𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

+ ∑ 𝜓𝑔 . 𝑃𝑔 − 𝜓𝑙𝐴 . 𝑃𝐿𝐴 )

(14)

𝑔=1

𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

arg min: 𝑃𝑔 , 𝑃𝐿𝐴 , 𝑃𝑆,𝑑 , 𝑃𝑆,𝑐 , 𝐸𝑆 , 𝜆𝑗
subject to:
𝐺
𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

∑ 𝑃𝑔 + 𝑃𝑆,𝑑 = 𝑃𝐷 + 𝑃𝐿𝐴 + 𝑃𝑆,𝑐 ∶ 𝜆𝑗 ,
𝑔=1

(15)

∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽]
0≤

𝑗
𝑃𝑔

𝑗

𝑗

≤ 𝑃𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∶ µ𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑔 , µ𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑔 ,

(16)
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∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽], ∀𝑔 ∈ [1, 𝐺]
𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

𝑚𝑎𝑥
0 ≤ 𝑃𝐿𝐴 ≤ 𝑃𝐿𝐴
∶ µ𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝐿𝐴 , µ𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝐿𝐴 ,

(17)

∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽]
𝑗

𝑗−1

𝐸𝑆 = 𝐸𝑆

𝑗

𝑗

+ 𝑃𝑆,𝑐 . 𝜂𝑆 − 𝑃𝑆,𝑑 : µ𝑗𝑆,𝐸 ,

(18)

∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽]
𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

𝑚𝑎𝑥
0 ≤ 𝑃𝑆,𝑐 ≤ 𝑃𝑆,𝑐
∶ µ𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑆,𝑐 , µ𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑆,𝑐 ,

(19)

∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽]
𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

𝑚𝑎𝑥
0 ≤ 𝑃𝑆,𝑑 ≤ 𝑃𝑆,𝑑
∶ µ𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝑆,𝑑 , µ𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑆,𝑑 ,

(20)

∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽]
𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

0 ≤ 𝐸𝑆 ≤ 𝐸𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∶ µ𝑚𝑖𝑛,𝐸 , µ𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝐸 ,

(21)

∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽]
The objective function (14) of the market clearing
model maximizes the total welfare of the market
participants based on their bids (𝜓) and scheduled
power consumption/generation. For the sake of
𝑗
simplicity, it is assumed that 𝑃𝐷 represents the fixed
inflexible electricity demand in the market. Eq. (15)
models the power balance constraint, which ensures that
𝑗
the total generation by conventional generators (𝑃𝑔 ) and
the power discharged by the large-scale storage unit
𝑗
𝑗
(𝑃𝑆,𝑑 ) should satisfy the sum of the inflexible load (𝑃𝐷 ),
𝑗

the flexible load represented by the aggregator (𝑃𝐿𝐴 ) and
𝑗
the charging load of the storage unit (𝑃𝑆,𝑐 ). In this study,
we have modeled a pumped hydro unit as the large-scale
storage unit. It can be noted that the Lagrange multiplier
of the power balance constraint represents the market
clearing price of electricity. Eq. (16) limits the power
generation of the conventional generators to be within
their minimum and maximum values, respectively,
while (17) restricts the LA’s power consumption to be
within the minimum and maximum limits. The
𝑚𝑎𝑥
maximum power consumption limit for the LA (𝑃𝐿𝐴
)
𝑚𝑎𝑥
is defined as ∑𝑛 𝑃𝑛 . The evolution of the storage level
𝑗
(𝐸𝑆 ) in the pumped storage unit is modeled in (18),
while technical constraints of this pumped storage unit
are expressed in (19) – (21).

3.4. Formulation of the bilevel model
As discussed earlier, the optimal strategic operation
of the LA can be formulated as a bilevel optimization
model, with the upper level (UL) corresponding to the
LA’s optimization problem and the lower level (LL)
corresponding to the market clearing process. This
section describes the formulation of this bilevel problem
into an equivalent single-level problem and subsequent
linearization of this single-level problem.

As the LL problem is linear, it can be guaranteed that
any solution which satisfies its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) conditions would also be the optimal solution of
the problem [24]. Therefore, we replace the LL market
clearing process with its KKT stationarity and
complementarity slackness conditions. However, the
complementarity slackness conditions are nonlinear.
These conditions are then linearized based on the
Fortuny-Amat transformations [25], by introducing
binary variables and large constants. The detailed
mathematical formulation of the stationarity conditions
and the linearization of the complementarity slackness
conditions of the market clearing process using FortunyAmat transformations can be referred to in [15], which
has a similar implementation.
The remaining non-linearities in the optimization
problem are in the objective function (3) of the LA,
𝑗
which includes bilinear terms for LA’s revenue (𝑃𝐿𝐴 . 𝜋 𝑗 )
𝑗
and LA’s costs (𝑃𝐿𝐴 . 𝜆𝑗 ). The revenue term can be
linearized by implementing a discretized approximation
of the retail price 𝜋 𝑗 as follows:
𝐾
𝑗

𝑚𝑖𝑛

𝑗
𝜉𝑘

𝑗
𝜉𝑘−1

𝜋 =𝜋

𝑗

+ ∆𝜋. ∑ 𝜉𝑘

(22)

𝑘=1

≤

∀𝑘 ∈ [2, 𝐽]

(23)

where, 𝜋 𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the minimum retail price, ∆𝜋 is the retail
𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥 −𝜋𝑚𝑖𝑛

𝑗

price step (
) and 𝜉𝑘 are the binary variables
𝐾
for each discrete step, indexed by k. Using this
discretization, the revenue term can be written as:
𝐾
𝑗
𝑃𝐿𝐴 . 𝜋 𝑗

=

𝑗
𝑃𝐿𝐴 . 𝜋 𝑚𝑖𝑛

𝑗

𝑗

+ ∆𝜋. ∑ 𝑃𝐿𝐴 . 𝜉𝑘

(24)

𝑘=1
𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

Next, we define a new variable 𝜔𝑘 = 𝑃𝐿𝐴 . 𝜉𝑘 , which
leads to the equation:
𝐾
𝑗
𝑃𝐿𝐴 . 𝜋 𝑗

=

𝑗
𝑃𝐿𝐴 . 𝜋 𝑚𝑖𝑛

𝑗

+ ∆𝜋. ∑ 𝜔𝑘

(25)

𝑘=1
𝑗
𝜔𝑘

The term
can be transformed into the following
linear constraints using a large constant (𝑀𝜋 ):
𝑗
𝑗
(26)
0 ≤ 𝜔𝑘 ≤ 𝜉𝑘 . 𝑀𝜋 , ∀𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝐽], ∀𝑘 ∈ [1, 𝐾]
𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

0 ≤ 𝑃𝐿𝐴 − 𝜔𝑘 ≤ (1 − 𝜉𝑘 ). 𝑀𝜋 , ∀𝑘 ∈ [1, 𝐾]

(27)

𝑗

The remaining bilinear cost term (𝑃𝐿𝐴 . 𝜆𝑗 ) can be
linearized by using the strong duality theorem,
according to which the primal and dual objectives are
equal at optimality [26]. Therefore, the strong duality
theorem allows exact linearization of the LA’s cost
term. Applying the strong duality theorem and using the
stationarity and complementarity slackness conditions
of the LL problem yields:
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𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
𝜆𝑗 . 𝑃𝐿𝐴 = −𝜓𝐷 . 𝑃𝐷 + ∑𝑔 𝜓𝑔 . 𝑃𝑔 + 𝜆𝑗 . 𝑃𝐷 +
𝑗
𝑗
𝑚𝑎𝑥
∑𝑔 𝜇𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑔 . 𝑃𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 − µ1𝑆,𝐸 . 𝐸𝑆0 + 𝜇𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑆,𝑐 . 𝑃𝑆,𝑐
+
𝑗
𝑗
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝜇𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑆,𝑑 . 𝑃𝑆,𝑑 + 𝜇𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝐸 . 𝐸𝑆

(28)

Using (25) and (28), the linearized reformulated singlelevel problem becomes:
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
max (𝑃𝐿𝐴 . 𝜋 𝑚𝑖𝑛 + ∆𝜋. ∑𝑘 𝜔𝑘 ) − (−𝜓𝐷 . 𝑃𝐷 +
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
𝑚𝑎𝑥
∑𝑔 𝜓𝑔 . 𝑃𝑔 + 𝜆 . 𝑃𝐷 + ∑𝑔 𝜇𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑔 . 𝑃𝑔
−
(29)
𝑗
𝑗
0
1
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑚𝑎𝑥
µ𝑆,𝐸 . 𝐸𝑆 + 𝜇𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑆,𝑐 . 𝑃𝑆,𝑐 + 𝜇𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝑆,𝑑 . 𝑃𝑆,𝑑 +
𝑗
𝜇𝑚𝑎𝑥,𝐸 . 𝐸𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 )
subject to (4)-(13), (15)-(21), KKT stationarity
conditions, Fortuny-Amat linearization of KKT
complementarity conditions, and (22)-(27). The
resulting single-level optimization problem lies in the
category of Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP)
which, although is non-convex because of the presence
of binary variables, but, can be solved efficiently using
commercial solvers.

4. Results and Discussion
This section discusses the preliminary results
obtained using the proposed bilevel model on the
impacts of strategic behavior and consumer constraints
on the welfare of the various entities involved.
Additionally, some insightful results highlighting the
potential drawbacks of exogenous price based models as
compared to integrated models are presented.

4.1. Test system
The developed bilevel model has been used to
conduct an annual analysis of consumer welfare, LA’s
profitability, and system performance under various
scenarios. The conventional generation portfolio of the
test system including the number of units and marginal
costs have been modelled according to [27]. The
installed generation capacities have been adjusted
according to the system peak load requirements. The
bids of the generating units are assumed to be equal to
their marginal costs. System inflexible demand profiles
are obtained using normalized system demand profiles
for the Irish power system for the year 2009 [28]. These
normalized profiles are scaled up keeping 7.2 GW as the
system peak load. The parameters of the two pumped
hydro units are modelled according to [29]. To model
the residential space heating demand, three Irish midflat
archetypes based on different periods and materials of
construction are considered. The total number of
midflats considered is circa 70,000 [20] and the thermal
modelling assumptions, and RTES technical
characteristics are modelled as described in [5].

The following models are implemented to compare
and understand the impacts of integrated and bilevel
modelling on system performance and LA profitability.
1. Centralized – Inflexible RTES demand (C-IFD): The
generation and RTES charging schedules are
obtained using the centralized market clearing model
(Section 3.3.), with integrated building models [5]
but with RTES devices operating as night-time
storage.
2. Centralized – Flexible RTES demand (C-FD): The
generation and RTES charging schedules are
obtained using the centralized market clearing model
(Section 3.3.), with integrated building models and
keeping RTES demand flexible. As this model study
determines RTES charging schedules through nonstrategic centralized dispatch, it represents the
optimal usage of RTES flexibility from the system’s
perspective.
3. Exogenous prices – Cost minimization (E-CM): The
LA takes exogenous electricity SMPs as input to its
optimization model (Section 3.2.), which minimizes
the LA’s total cost.
4. Bilevel – Cost minimization (B-CM): The strategic
market operation of the LA is considered using the
bilevel model described in Section 3.4., keeping cost
minimization as LA’s objective.
5. Bilevel – Profit Maximization (B-PM): The
strategic market operation of the LA is considered
using the bilevel model described in Section 3.4.,
keeping profit maximization as LA’s objective.
The contract parameters β, and the minimum and
maximum retail price limits are taken as exogenous
inputs in the model. For the base case in all the models,
the values of β = 20% (i.e. 20% consumer cost
reduction), 𝜋 𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 30€/MWh (lowest marginal cost of
conventional generators), 𝜋 𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 93€/MWh (highest
marginal cost of conventional generators). In order to
understand how different values of these contract
parameters could affect the different stakeholders, a
sensitivity analysis for β and 𝜋 𝑚𝑎𝑥 has been presented
in Section 4.2. Additionally, the retail price is equal to
SMP for the C-FD, E-CM and B-CM models, while it is
equal to the night time tariff for the C-IFD model.
The models are implemented in GAMS and are
solved at hourly resolution with a look-ahead horizon of
24 hours assuming perfect forecast. It must be noted that
the assumption of perfect forecast might not be realistic
for modelling the market clearing problem, especially
with large penetration of variable renewable resources.
However, this assumption has been made to ensure
computational tractability of the bilevel model given the
requirement of path dependent optimization for
management of storage devices. Also, in the case study
that follows, variable renewable resources are not
included.
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4.2. Importance of integrated modelling
Figure 1 shows the total power consumption of the
LA and SMP for the E-CM and C-FD models in order
to highlight the importance of using integrated models
as compared to exogenous price-based models. The
SMP profile from C-FD is used as input for the E-CM
model and the resulting LA power consumption is fed
back to the C-FD model to determine the impacts on
SMP.

depicted in Figure 2. It can be observed in panel (A) that
in the inflexible night time storage model (C-IFD), the
heating energy consumption for each house is very high
compared to C-FD (approximately 64% of the energy
consumption in C-IFD). This is because under night
time operation, the RTES devices are fully charged
every day irrespective of the daily heating requirement,
making their operation very inefficient in terms of
energy consumption. When aiming to minimize its costs
(B-CM), the LA reduces the power it purchases and thus
the results are almost identical to the centrally optimal
values determined in C-FD. However, when
maximizing profits (B-PM), the LA purchases much
more energy from the electricity market in order to
achieve the maximum possible revenue from selling the
energy to the consumers. Therefore, it can be concluded
that the profit maximization behavior of a LA with DLC
would not be energy efficient. However, the energy
consumption is still circa 2% lower than the inflexible
C-IFD case as the LA is bound to reduce consumer costs
due to constraint (13).
These differences in heating energy consumption
profiles translate into differences in consumer costs as
shown in panel (B). The results show that the consumers
would have to pay only 39% of the costs they paid in the
C-IFD case if the LA aims to minimize its costs (B-CM)
and pass on all the cost reductions to the consumers. The
profit maximization behavior (B-PM) expectedly results

Figure 1. Importance of integrated modelling

It can be observed from panel (A) in Figure 1 that
even though the objective of E-CM is to reduce LA
costs, the resulting power consumption profile is
different from C-FD. This is because the minimum cost
solution for E-CM is not unique, therefore, several
power consumption profiles can have the same cost for
the LA while meeting the heating requirement (e.g.
when input SMP is the same for several hours of the
day). These differences in power consumption would be
expected to be further increased when the LA would aim
to maximize profits. The resulting impact on SMP is
shown in panel (B) of Figure 1. It can be seen e.g. for
hours 6 and 7 that the increased concentration of power
consumption for the E-CM model would have a
feedback impact on SMP resulting in higher prices as
compared to those initially determined using C-FD.
Changes in SMP also imply that exogenous price based
models can also lead to additional start-ups and shutdowns of generation units, making the system operation
less economical. Therefore, these results highlight the
merits of using integrated models for analysis of flexible
demand instead of exogenous price based models.

4.3. Impacts of strategic behavior
The impacts of the LA’s strategic behavior on the
consumers’ welfare and the power system operation are

Figure 2. Impacts of LA’s strategic
behavior on consumer and system
welfare
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in higher costs for consumers as the LA tries to
maximize its revenues. However, the consumers still are
better off when being controlled by a profit maximizing
LA as compared to the inflexible night storage operation
due to the cost reduction constraint (13). Indeed, the
consumer costs are reduced by circa 20% as specified
by the retail contract parameter β.
Finally, the impacts of strategic LA behavior on
annual system generation costs are presented in panel
(C). The performance of B-CM is again almost identical
to the centralized C-FD as in order to minimize costs,
the LA not only reduces the energy consumption but
also purchases energy during low SMP periods, thereby
aligning its performance with centrally optimized
results. However, LA’s profit maximization increases
the system costs as compared to C-FD primarily because
of the increase in energy consumption. However, B-PM
can still achieve significant reduction in generation costs
as compared to C-IFD. This is because in C-IFD, the
RTES devices consume fixed amounts of energy
irrespective of the system conditions while in B-PM, the
LA purchases energy during periods of low SMP to
increase its profit margin. These results highlight that
the behavior and objectives of the LA can not only have
significant implications for the consumers, but also on
the power system operation. It must also be noted that
the model presented in the paper assumes that the LA
can manage the operation of all the RTES devices
owned by the consumers who have chosen to enter the
DLC contract. If some of the consumers choose to opt
out from the DLC contract, the LA would have a
reduced magnitude of controllable demand, which could
translate into reduced profitability of the LA and
increased system generation costs.
It can be concluded from the results presented above
that centrally optimized results would not be valid in the
presence of a strategic LA as they would tend to
overestimate the system value of flexible load.
Nevertheless, the presence of a profit maximizing LA is
still beneficial for the system as compared to the loads
being inflexible.

the consumer costs. Additionally, as the maximum retail
price (𝜋 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) increases, there are some additional
reductions in energy consumption. This is because
increase in 𝜋 𝑚𝑎𝑥 allows the LA to purchase lesser
energy without impacting the profitability (i.e. by
charging higher prices to consumers for smaller
volumes of energy). Therefore, restricting the LA’s
profitability by increasing 𝛽 improves energy
efficiency, while restricting the LA’s profitability by
reducing 𝜋 𝑚𝑎𝑥 would reduce the energy efficiency.
The impacts of the retail contracts on consumer costs
are shown in panel (B). As expected, higher values of 𝛽,
result in lower consumer costs as compared to the CIFD model. It can also be observed that for a given value
of β, the maximum retail price (𝜋 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) does not have any
noticeable impacts on consumer costs. This is because
the LA only needs to reduce consumer costs by 𝛽%, so
for smaller values of 𝜋 𝑚𝑎𝑥 , the LA purchases more
energy in order to offset the impact of reduced 𝜋 𝑚𝑎𝑥 .

4.4. Impacts of retail contract design
As mentioned in Section 3, the LA has a direct load
control (DLC) contract with the consumers subject to
retail contract constraints (11) – (13). In this section, we
explore the impacts of varying the retail contract
parameters β (consumer cost reduction percentage) and
𝜋 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (maximum retail price) in the LA’s profit
maximization (B-PM) model.
It can be seen in panel (A) of Figure 3 that as the
agreed consumer cost reduction increases (i.e.
𝛽 increases), there is a significant reduction in heating
energy consumption because the LA is bound to reduce

Figure 3. Importance of the specification
of retail contract parameters
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Panel (C) presents the impacts of the retail contracts
on LA’s profitability. It can be noticed that 𝛽 has a very
significant impact on LA’s profits as an increase in 𝛽
from 0% to 40% reduces the LA’s profits by circa 80%.
This can be explained by the fact that reduction in 𝛽
reduces the LA’s revenue, while the LA’s cost reduction
by reducing energy consumption is bounded by
consumer’s thermal comfort requirements, thereby
resulting in much lower profits. For a given value of β,
increase in 𝜋 𝑚𝑎𝑥 allows the LA to achieve increase in
profits as the LA can purchase energy only during
periods of low SMP and charge higher retail prices to
the consumers.
Finally, the impacts on system generation costs are
shown in panel (D). The generation costs profile mirrors
the heating energy consumption profile shown in Panel
(A). As discussed earlier, increasing 𝛽 and
increasing 𝜋 𝑚𝑎𝑥 force the LA to be energy efficient and
to purchase energy during periods of low SMP,
respectively, thereby reducing the system generation
costs, and thus driving the results towards centrally
optimal values.
The analysis presented above leads to the conclusion
that for contracts involving direct load control (DLC),
𝛽 has a much greater impact on consumers’, LA’s and
system’s welfare as compared to 𝜋 𝑚𝑎𝑥 . Additionally,
contrary to intuition, allowing the LA to charge higher
retail prices would be socially beneficial under DLC
contracts. This is due to the fact that increasing 𝜋 𝑚𝑎𝑥 for
a given value of β doesn’t impact the consumers’
welfare, but results in higher profits for the LA and
lower system generation costs, thereby improving the
net social welfare.

designing the retail contract parameters was
highlighted, as they not only affect the welfare of the
consumers and the LA but also the operation of the
power system.
Future work would present more detailed results
using the proposed model and present some additional
sensitivities
of
other
important
parameters.
Additionally, the market clearing problem presented in
this paper doesn’t incorporate variable renewable
resources. The inclusion of these resources would
require consideration of the uncertainty associated to the
prediction of these resources. Moreover, consumer optout contingency could also be formulated as a stochastic
event with a certain probability distribution. Therefore,
the framework presented in this paper could be extended
by formulating it as a stochastic optimization problem
and considering the impacts of uncertainty on the value
of aggregator-controlled flexible demand. Additionally,
it would also be interesting to explore the operation of
the LA when it simultaneously participates in provision
of ancillary services in addition to energy arbitrage.

5. Conclusion

[4]

This paper presented a novel bilevel formulation for
understanding the impacts of the strategic behavior of a
profit maximizing load aggregator (LA) in the
electricity market while being constrained by
consumers’ welfare based on retail contract
specifications. The results of the bilevel model were
compared with other models including centralized and
exogenous price based models. The results depicted the
drawbacks of exogenous price based models in terms of
not being able to capture the feedback impact of change
in demand on electricity price. Additionally, based on
the preliminary results for the considered test system
presented in this paper, it was observed that the strategic
profit maximizing behavior of the LA results in
deviation of system performance from centrally
optimized results, thereby indicating that centralized
models would tend to overestimate the system value of
demand response. Finally, the need for carefully
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